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Theory and Practice in Criminal Law1
A lawyer, and especially a professor of law, should not speak in paradox-
es, because paradoxes arouse mistrust and may undermine the authority 
of the person who uses them. However, it is not always the case that 
a paradox is merely a flashy display of words; occasionally it may con-
vey some real meaning. Hence, when writing on theory and practice 
in criminal law, I shall use a formulation that I consider right, relying 
on my experience and having given it a lot of thought, although it will 
take the form of a paradox. 
First, however, I shall make a few comments that are in part per-
sonal and in part relate to the subject at hand. I cannot assume the role 
of a representative of this or that side, I rather stand between them, in 
the middle, as my current position does not abrogate my work as a judge 
for over a decade. I am, therefore, equally close to both sides. By ‘prac-
tice’ I do not mean people (judges, defence counsel, public prosecutors) 
but rather the current legislation together with the judicial decisions, 
with regard to which statutory provisions leave little room for discre-
tion. Therefore, my comments cannot concern the so-called practitio-
ners of criminal-law, but I may only mention that I would like to see 
more criticism on their part than is evident in the current state of affairs. 
1 Translated from: J.J. Bossowski, Teoria i praktyka w prawie karnym, “Ruch Prawniczy, 
Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny” 1924, 6 by Tomasz Żebrowski and proofread by Stephen 
Dersley and Ryszard Reisner. The translation and proofreading were financed by the Min-
istry of Science and Higher Education under 848/2/P-DUN/2018.
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By theory, I mean law as it should be in statu nascendi. Now I come to 
the point, that is, to the paradox I mentioned. At present, theory is practi-
cal, and practice is theoretical. Before anyone takes aim at me, let them 
read the subsequent comments on which I base my views, with each of 
these comments deserving to be made the subject of a dissertation. 
The practice of law still demands that punishment should be based 
on guilt and retribution.2 Thus, it is on a wild goose chase, because the 
determination of guilt (degree of guilt) in a specific case and the ad-
justment of retribution (intensity of retribution) to the degree of guilt 
is not humanly possible. This is a hangover from the times when 
criminal law was based on philosophical abstractions, or was derived 
from them. Theory demands that criminal law be based on the aspect 
of purposefulness: criminal law is bring about the defence of society 
against criminals, while the nature and limits of this defence are to 
be indicated by experience (criminal statistics) and the observation 
of life (in particular the observation of the milieu criminel, i.e. the 
sociological aspects and the observation of a criminal’s psyche). This 
entails a transition to the ‘straightforward story’ of facts and conclu-
sions based on facts. 
Duo si faciunt idem, non est idem. This necessary principle of jus-
tice is recognised by practice, with some reservations, not due to any 
fault of its own, but because it is compelled by statute. In the case of 
murder,3 it does not matter for either the terminology of the act or pun-
ishment (the death penalty is always prescribed, without exception) 
whether the crime was committed purely due to inhuman savagery or for 
some quite different reason (e.g. unhappy cohabitation, jealousy, etc.), 
or whether it was the result of a criminal psyche (an individual posing 
a constant threat to society, one who will commit another murder soon 
2 Retribution as an element of revenge is the backbone of present-day law, with some of its 
provisions strongly emphasising this aspect. For instance, French regulations accord prior-
ity seats to the parents of a victim at the execution of the murderer. 
3 Under the statute in force in the Recovered Territories; analogous instances can be found in 
other provincial statutes. 
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if they remains at large). Moreover, whether the above resulted from an 
unhappy coincidence that upset the perpetrator’s moral balance (the so-
called occasional criminal whose trials and tribulations before and after 
the act and the act itself break them down completely, an individual who 
will not commit a second murder even if, due to the circumstances, they 
are not punished and remain at large). 
I have chosen a particularly extreme example but nevertheless, 
practice must (because it is compelled by statute) squeeze crimes into 
the statutory formulae that only conventionally take into account the 
perpetrator-related aspects (kinds of guilt) and ignore the whole gamut 
of the perpetrator’s mental properties. On the other hand, theory fol-
lows the following line of thought: punishment will be purposeful, i.e. it 
will serve its purpose of social defence if an individually designated 
criminal (person A or B) is either deterred, corrected or neutralised. 
To find out which of these goals is achievable and advisable, it is nec-
essary to get to know the criminal who is on trial as a living person 
and classify their psyche (occasional criminal, habitual criminal, incor-
rigible criminal or one capable of being corrected). It is not enough to 
establish that the facts in the case, established in evidentiary proceed-
ings, fit the statutory construction of the crime. Obviously, only a pur-
poseful punishment may constitute an effective punishment, i.e. serving 
its function. 
An alcoholic offender, or a criminal with diminished responsibil-
ity will receive a more lenient punishment than that given to a normal 
criminal, because their guilt is less than that of normal criminals. This 
is right and logical, as long as guilt is held to be the cornerstone of 
criminal law. But what results does this bring for society? Such a crim-
inal is undoubtedly more dangerous to society than a normal criminal, 
hence social defence must be stronger in this case, not weaker. A reac-
tion to the criminal act will be purposeful only if the criminal is either 
cured or (if this is not possible) neutralised. Whether this reaction will 
be called a sanction (as in the Italian draft), a preventive measure, or 
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will be referred to by some other name, is for the editors of the code to 
decide. The content does not depend on the name, and this content 
must replace the completely pointless punishments hitherto meted 
out in such cases. 
There is a similar state of affairs with incorrigible criminals. Today’s 
legislation has no cognisance of this type of criminal, but it does none-
theless exist. Criminal statistics and the experience of judges show this 
quite clearly. Practice will mete out a harsher punishment for a repeat 
offence or compulsive criminality than in ordinary cases, but the punish-
ment will not attain the goal it must necessarily pursue, for it will not 
neutralise an incorrigible criminal. The sentence will come to an end, 
and the state authorities will, in Liszt’s words, set this criminal free like 
a wild animal about to attack society. Such criminals are eternal revo-
lutionaries, harming the legal order. The chances that they will adapt to 
social life are nil; they are the incarnation of imminent danger to society. 
Impossible to deter or correct, their murderous energy must simply be 
incapacitated. Therefore, in this area, theory juxtaposes the completely 
ineffective and overly lenient treatment accorded to incorrigible crimi-
nals with  the practice of casting them outside society (artificial selec-
tion) through long-term or even life sentences (Liszt’s opinion). 
There is great divergence in the views on juvenile delinquency. For 
theory, the only purposeful response lies in educational and educational-
correctional measures, and this maybe accompanied by favourable re-
sults obtained by such measures in other countries. Moreover, theory can 
claim that some of its postulates have been realised in the current legis-
lation. In contrast, practice tends to take a rather sceptical stance, with 
practitioners sometimes calling for corporal punishment (these are not 
isolated calls). I will avoid joining the general discussion as to whether 
corporal punishment is a suitable penal measure (personally, I am certain 
that it is not). I shall only mention important mental aspects. In the era 
when the average citizen of a state was accorded only ‘limited capacity 
for reasoning, as a subject’, while the absence of political life, or restric-
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tions in this regard, prevented any development of individuality, thus 
forcing  an  individual  to  content  themselves with  a  predefined  career, 
a certain effectiveness was enjoyed by exclusively coercive measures, 
as they proved effective for weak individuals. Now, when political life 
is fully developed (or even hyper-developed), as respect for individual-
ity has been introduced into all walks of life, no brutal measure (such as 
flogging) can be used, and it will not be acknowledged that putting con-
stant pressure on the will of the individual has any pedagogical or penal 
value. Only such measures that have a lasting and positive effect on the 
psyche (character training, improvement of conduct) can be described 
as effective. Corporal punishment does not belong to such measures; nor 
can it attain another goal of punishment, namely neutralisation. 
The negative opinions of German courts and public prosecutor’s of-
fices concerning the conditional suspension of sentences are well-known 
(in this, case, practice was supported by some representatives of theory). 
However, suspended sentences are supported not only by the favour-
able experiences of Western-Romanic and English-speaking countries, 
but also by psychological aspects. In the case of a suspended sentence, 
the rehabilitation of criminals (at least, so-called civic rehabilitation) 
coincides with their obvious interests, as a result of which the impulse 
of a criminal  instinct meets with a strong counter-impulse. Moreover, 
the State makes prudent use of the deterrent power of imprisonment on 
individuals who have not suffered this punishment before (it is such in-
dividuals that are at issue here). The deterrent power, if used reasonably, 
is a strong positive factor acting on the criminal whose sentence has 
been suspended, while it is lost forever without effect once a sentence 
is served. A criminal who has served time in prison is like a traveller in 
the Latin proverb who cantabit coram latrone as he has already nothing 
to lose. 
The measure of the value of current legislation is its construction, 
while the measure of the value of new law must be its effectiveness, i.e. 
criminal statistics. Attempts have been made to coin the term ‘law to 
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combat crime’ (Thomsen) to underscore the law’s practical character. 
On numerous occasions, overestimating4 the aspect of legal construction 
has led to practice being uselessly overburdened. I shall restrict myself 
to one example. Theft and embezzlement are so close to each other in 
terms of content and social significance that Liszt believed they could be 
fused into a single offence. However, their different constructions, based 
on a doubtful criterion of differentiation, forced the courts, in a great 
number of instances, to conduct painstaking findings of fact (despite the 
offence being self-evident) and cite convoluted legal arguments, theo-
retically often valuable and subtle, but not producing any positive social 
effect. The purposefulness and effectiveness of punishment was not and 
cannot be helped by such work. 
Theory demands that the languages of the criminal code and of the 
courts be made more democratic. The language of the code should be in-
telligible to a citizen of the State. The current style of statutes does not 
fulfil this criterion. Many clauses in this or that provincial statute require 
comments by legal scholars and judicial decisions; even a lawyer would 
not be able, relying on the text of a local statute alone, to determine what 
the following are: a commencement of execution, violence to the person, 
concentration, insult, etc. The definitions of fraud are excessively compli-
cated in all provincial statutes, despite the fact the essence of act is quite 
straightforward. The establishment of juries in those provinces where they 
are unknown (former Russian and German ones) will probably occur in 
the near future. When this happens, throughout Poland we will encoun-
ter a phenomenon all too familiar to practice in Małopolska, namely that 
of jurors being unable to comprehend questions posed to them, due to 
their muddled and unintelligible formulation. This is unavoidable, since 
it is due to the language of a statute. If the formulation of a norm itself 
4 I use the word ‘overestimate’, because construction is necessary; if it were not there, perni-
cious arbitrariness would arise; overestimating construction, in turn, is pernicious, too, as 
it overshadows other aspects that are equally important and relevant for criminal law. In 
addition, it leads to excessive subtlety in defining legal concepts, which is believed to be 
the hallmark of legal studies and judicial decisions. 
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(a statutory prohibition) is not felicitous, the need to use the statutory 
definition  of  an  attempt  to  aid  and  abet  exacerbates  this  defect  further 
and produces the following question: ‘Is A guilty of intentionally making 
person B, with a gift or otherwise, divulge his intention to take the life of 
person C through intentional acts, but done without premeditation, that 
comprise the commencement of the execution of the crime of homicide?’ 
(An example given by Rosenberg in his dissertation on juries). I do not 
think that any lawyer will call this question overly clear and easy. Hence, 
it is vital to simplify the language of statutes. Equally vital is the need to 
simplify the language of the courts, both in terms of speech and writing. 
In this case, the change is straightforward, as it depends solely on the will 
of practitioners, whereas the language of statutes and a defective statute 
are inherited by humanity (as Mephisto correctly explained to a scholar), 
as chronic diseases from generation to generation. 
Nonetheless, no tendency towards change can be noticed in prac-
tice, or even a sense of how much a change is needed. The language 
of the courts (especially the language of interviews and records) should 
be flexible and capable of adjusting to  the  intellectual and linguistic 
level of the interviewee. Instead, only too often do we come across le-
gal expressions in the interview records whose colloquial meaning 
differs considerably from their legal meaning, or which are practically 
unknown to those outside the legal profession. We encounter such ex-
pressions as ‘criminal decision’, ‘consideration’, etc. And yet it is the 
witness who is responsible for the contents of a record, on pain of 
criminal liability; while the defendant has the procedural right to have 
their explanations faithfully recorded, and it is this faithfulness that is 
so easily distorted when these explanations are pointlessly translated 
into legal-judicial jargon. That this is not just a shortcoming of our 
practice is evident from the many comments by Anatole France on 
French practice. It goes without saying that putting a question to a wit-
ness that contains a legal term may lead to many results other than ac-
tually revealing the truth. 
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Theory assigns criminalistics (or forensics—scientific crime detec-
tion) an important place in criminology and demands that a university 
chair be founded for this science, along with other criminological sci-
ences. Meanwhile, as a rule impractical practice does not care much5 
about this body of decidedly practical knowledge, despite the avail-
ability of accessible literature (French works by Reiss, Goddefroy, 
Locard, Gardenat, German ones by Gross, Gross-Höpler and Heindl, 
a valuable pamphlet in Polish by Olbrycht O postępowaniu z dowoda-
mi  rzeczowymi,  and  books  by  Łukomski  and  Stepek-Krystańczyk). 
Criminalistics is not part of a judge’s examination and I have abso-
lutely no knowledge (I would prefer to be wrong) of opinions ema-
nating from the circles of practitioners that demand a change. Thus, 
you can be an examining magistrate with no knowledge of forensics. 
In effect, the best pieces of evidence (so-called exhibits) are wasted, 
because the judge either does not take any notice of them or ‘misreads’ 
the material placed before the court, instead of making effective use of 
it. Knowledge of forensics therefore is a must for a judge (an examin-
ing magistrate or a judge hearing criminal cases), defence counsel and 
public prosecutor. 
How radically theory has given up the old method of abstract treat-
ment of problems can be seen in the fact that opinions are voiced by 
its representatives (Dernburg, Zitelmann, and recently Kantorowicz in: 
Zukunft des Strafrechtes by Dehnow) suggesting that law studies should 
be divided into three stages, by inserting between the initial theoreti-
cal  course  and  final  theoretical-practical  course,  a  two-year  practical 
programme of study. A curriculum which is—evidently—clearly not 
theoretical. 
5 Of course, I have to recognize that in some cases forensic knowledge is used. However, the 
view expressed in this text is based on personal observations made while reviewing many 
statutes, coming from various provinces and information communicated to me by several 
professors of forensic medicine (v. also the pamphlet by Prof. Olbrycht mentioned in the 
text). I would consider it normal if every case were examined from the point of view of 
criminalistics, because only then would it be guaranteed that many and the best pieces 
of evidence are not lost to no avail. 
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Practice is concerned with the course of criminal proceedings from 
the moment they are instituted until their valid termination. What hap-
pened before the proceedings, because of a specific crime, and what will 
happen once they are terminated is of no concern to practice. The period 
when a criminal was on the skids, as it were, drifting towards crime, the 
individual or social factors that bore upon them at this time, the effec-
tiveness or ineffectiveness of punishment once the proceedings are over, 
in particular finding that the criminal has improved or they are incorri-
gible, or indeed the ethical and mental experiences of the convict while 
serving time in prison—these are the aspects which a judge believes to 
be only loosely related to his profession. 
This is a highly undesirable narrowing of horizons, because crimi-
nal proceedings are only an intermediate link between the time when 
a crime is imminent, and the sentence is carried out. This is the link 
that is the most closely tied to the preceding and following ones. The 
purposeful dimension of punishment is not possible without learn-
ing about the individual and social aspects of a criminal’s life prior to 
a crime; criminal proceedings are a quite unnecessary outlay of labour if 
they do not bring any results over a longer period. Therefore, criminol-
ogy broadens the horizons in two directions: it shows that it is neces-
sary to deal preventively with the individual who is falling into crime, 
and demands that the stage of administering punishment be considered 
equally important with court proceedings. 
Rejecting prevention would be just as unreasonable as rejecting 
hygiene in medicine and limiting oneself to treatment. Prevention 
saves not just individuals, but also interests that would fall victim to 
a crime. What bodies should be entrusted with prevention? Perhaps 
it should be made the responsibility of civic patrons or administra-
tive authorities or, possibly, court divisions set up for this purpose. 
This is a question of the legislative technique, but it must be admitted 
that punitive measures alone will not suffice to combat crime. Theory 
(Roux) pins hopes on creating administrative prohibitions, removing 
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opportunities to commit crimes due to a lack of self-control or because 
of an easy opportunity (facilités criminelles, for instance public sales 
in great department stores). 
The administration of punishment is still considered a mechani-
cal enforcement of the letter of the sentence; facts revealed during the 
administration of punishment or events that happened in the course of 
it may not (unless they reveal a miscarriage of justice) have a retroac-
tive effect on the judgment; the only thing they can do (provided they 
are positive and important) is bring about an administrative pardon. And 
yet only in the course of the punishment that it is possible to determine 
if it is effective, or what other punishment would be needed and effec-
tive. Such a diagnosis can only be made after a long observation of the 
convict’s psyche and the effect punishment has on them. In the course of 
a trial such observations cannot be made, hence the strict administration 
of punishment defined by  the  sentence  (which  is  the provision of  the 
current legislation) has too many characteristics of a conjectural and 
accidental nature. 
These practical considerations gave rise to the idea of moving the 
exact determination of the severity of the punishment to the stage of its 
administration and requiring that the sentence indicate the punishment ap-
proximately, by specifying its lower and upper limits (so-called indetermi-
nate sentences). Then, the final determination of punishment would have 
to be preceded by a detailed examination and observation of the convict. 
In this way, accidents and conventional solutions could be avoided. This 
idea was born in a country of thoroughly realistic concepts: America. It 
is being applied in the Polish draft bill on juvenile courts to the determina-
tion of the severity of correctional measures. 
I would like these comments to help rectify false opinions on crimi-
nal law that are in the making. It is assumed that it will be a theoretical 
construct, a utopian one in its humanitarianism, and thus ineffectual. 
I wish to dispel this myth. It will be much harsher than the current one 
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where needed (with respect to incorrigible criminals) and if it brings 
about a shift  in other fields  from the current pointless and  ineffective 
harshness (e.g. the use of penal measures with respect to juvenile of-
fenders) to crime prevention, it will satisfy the demands of culture for 
the benefit of society. 
In  a  few years’  time,  a unified criminal  law, based on new  ideas, 
will  be  ready. Then  practice will  face  a  difficult  task:  it will  have  to 
bridge the huge gap between the old and new law, reject the dogmas that 
have run in its blood for generations, and absorb new ideas to be able 
to put them into action. We all hope that this task will be completed in 
the best way possible, for the benefit of the State. It would be beneficial 
to cast off now everything that is not required by the present statute but 
which is merely an inherited anachronism. 
Perhaps now the paradox with which these comments started will 
not seem too shocking. Besides, paradoxes and criminology are geneti-
cally closer than it seems; after all, the modern master of paradox left his 
mark (albeit a sad one) on the history of criminology. 
A few more words. It is all too easy to be misunderstood and un-
willingly strike the chord of one’s professional or personal sensitivity 
in spite of the fact that one speaks with an eye to objective reasons and 
arguments. I do not want my comments to be taken as the criticism of 
those who administer the law (judges or state prosecutors) that under 
difficult  conditions,  struggling against  the  shortage of personnel, per-
form their important tasks. That the point here is not criticism I men-
tioned at the outset; the lion’s share of the above-mentioned shortcom-
ings is a result of the current legislation. I must emphasise that it is 
the new law (and its supporters) that demands that those who admin-
ister the law be assigned a still more important and independent role 
than their current one. Those who administer the law are to be not only 
(as today) ‘servants of the statute’ or an instrument that blindly applies 
a statutory provision. Instead, knowing, understanding and assessing 
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life, in all its manifestations and living people, they should be a factor in 
the development of law6—next to statute drafters—and not only guard 
the provisions of statutes, but also achieve its long-term objectives. It is 
my strong desire and wish for the law enforcement authorities to muster 
and find the ‘will power’ necessary for future actions. It is only fitting to 
apply to my comments the motto: honny soit qui mal y pense. 
6 For instance, a German draft bill leaves to the judge’s discretion, in the case of an inapt at-
tempt, not only what kind and the severity of punishment should be inflicted, but also if it 
should be inflicted at all. Moreover, there is an observable tendency to institute and expand 
the so-called judge-granted pardon. It is found in the Polish territory only in the former 
Russian partition by virtue of the Transitional Provisions.
